Israeli Security Firm Uncovers Banned Nvidia Blackwell Chips in Chinese State Network
Lava identified 32 export-restricted B300 GPUs within China Telecom's infrastructure, challenging Nvidia's claim that chip smuggling remains a negligible issue for the U.S. tech giant.
By Khalid Rahman ·

Nvidia has maintained that the discovery of export-controlled hardware in China is a minor anomaly, asserting that the scale of smuggling does not significantly impact its global market position. This stance follows a report by Israeli cybersecurity firm Lava, which identified 32 Nvidia Blackwell Ultra B300 chips operating within the network of China Telecom, a state-owned telecommunications provider. The presence of these specific chips is notable because U.S. export controls have barred them from sale to China, raising critical questions about how high-performance computing resources continue to reach Chinese data centers despite strict regulatory frameworks.
The identification of the hardware highlights the persistent difficulty in enforcing export restrictions on high-demand silicon. The B300 series, like its predecessor, can only be sold to buyers on a specific whitelist who agree not to transfer the technology to sanctioned parties. However, the appearance of these units in a major Chinese state network suggests that the compliance mechanisms may have gaps. The findings contribute to a growing body of evidence that suggests the flow of advanced AI chips into China is more robust than previously assumed.
This incident is part of a larger pattern of export control evasion over the past year. In 2025, reports indicated that Chinese companies had smuggled approximately $1 billion worth of Nvidia AI chips into the country over a three-month period. While the B200 was the primary target during that surge, distributors had already begun positioning themselves to trade in the newer B300 series as it became available. The current discovery confirms that the pipeline for these next-generation chips remains active despite ongoing enforcement efforts.
Nvidia has not denied the specific findings but has contextually minimized their significance. A spokesperson noted that government agencies, researchers, and media outlets have found only insignificant diversion of controlled U.S. products, with recent court cases showing figures less than half of one percent. The company described this volume as a "drop in the bucket" compared to the vast amount of domestic computing power China already possesses. Nvidia emphasized that with tens of millions of GPUs in service across approved countries, the ongoing smuggling represents a non-factor that is being addressed by governments on both sides of the globe.
The methodology used by Lava to locate the chips offers a glimpse into the technical vulnerabilities of modern data center monitoring. The firm identified the hardware using Nvidia’s own DCGM Exporter tool, a software utility designed for internal use by data center operators to monitor server health and performance. Although intended for internal diagnostics, this tool can sometimes be accessed from outside the data center's network and, notably, does not always require password authentication. While Nvidia has acknowledged working on a dedicated tool to locate its chips, that solution has not yet been released, leaving third-party monitoring methods as the primary means of detection.
The B300 chips are highly sought after due to their superior capabilities compared to previous generations. Announced in March of last year, the Blackwell Ultra B300 offers substantial performance improvements, including 50% more memory and FP4 compute power than the B200. Nvidia positioned the chip as being built for the age of reasoning, specifically highlighting its suitability for sophisticated large language models like DeepSeek R1. Originally expected to ship by the end of 2025, the chip quickly became a high-value asset in the global AI infrastructure market.
The urgency to acquire these chips has led to complex and sometimes illicit supply chains. In August 2026, nine individuals in Taiwan were indicted for the illegal export of B300 GPUs to China. This legal action occurred shortly after Supermicro confirmed it had terminated several employees following an internal investigation into smuggling activities. The schemes often involve intermediaries with whitelisted status, such as the Taiwanese server trading firm Flying Tiget Tech, which was implicated in the complicated process of moving hardware across borders.
The scarcity of new-generation chips has also driven up the price of older Nvidia silicon, creating a ripple effect throughout the market. The A100, a server component from five years ago, has seen its price triple, reaching up to $82,000 per unit. This price inflation underscores the critical role Nvidia’s hardware plays in AI data centers. In some cases, the demand for dedicated AI chips has even led organizations to retool gaming GPUs for AI workloads, demonstrating the pervasive nature of the computational resource crunch.
As the tech industry continues to grapple with the balance between national security and commercial demand, the discovery in China Telecom’s network serves as a reminder that physical enforcement of digital export controls remains challenging. While Nvidia insists the issue is manageable, the continued appearance of banned hardware in critical infrastructure suggests that the tug-of-war over advanced computing resources will remain a central theme in the geopolitical landscape of technology.
Source: Tom's Hardware


